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Cuşmir, Carolina
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Sisteme constituţionale semiprezidenţiale: analiză juridico-politică Semi-Prezidential System were extremely little wide-spread else two-three of ten of the years back. Many researchers separate the standpoint that he exist Weimar republic and as before functions in Heel to French republic. Finland. Sn-1 Portugal, some add hereto list Austria. Iceland and Ireland Beginning with 90-h past centuries, when row of the countries of the former Soviet Union and East were infused in "wave to democratizations"\ a part of them adapted the Prezidentialism of the rate, having bolted them constitutional Some authors b more forty Semi-Prezidential of the systems on political card of the modem including seventeen of them - on post socialist space In their count, calculate. Romania. Ukraine. Poland. Armenia. Federation of Russia. Lithuania and row Within the framework of given work will is analyzed formation, development evolution Semi-Prezidentialism in country of the Europe, stages of his(its) develop w ell as contents existing in scientific literature of the constitutional alternatives access institutional design. -
Considerente asupra sistemului constituţional în statele Europei Centrale şi de Est This paper presents a preliminary attempt to account for variation in changes in presidential power across post-communist presidential governments. It argues that economic reforms that produce concentrated economic benefits lead the winners from reform to seek institutional change in the powers of the presidency. Where the party system is too weak to protect their gains (and too weak defend the parliament as an organization), the winners from economic reform have strong incentives ally with the president to push for greater power for the executive. In the post-communist world countries with a rapid redistribution of wealth and fragmented party systems have experienced the greatest expansions of presidential power. -
Cu privire la tendinţa administraţiei publice de a evolua în putere publică In the classic constitutional concept, the administration represents the real executive power based on the public power procedures. In this conception, the administration is not the only duty of the Executive, but it is an exclusive one. As an argument of sustaining this idea, it is shown that the Executive, through Government, has a multitude of extra administrative duties, provided in the constitutional relationships with the Parliament or in the international ones. In the meantime, the Administration is the exclusive duty of the Executive, because it could not be exercised by the judicial power, legislative power according to the separation of powers in the state. Contemporary political West European regimes’ observation shows that all these concepts can be found in the institutional practices, proving that the Administration can be tempted to become the center of a distinctive power from the one of the Government. The politicians’ power depends on the length of their political mandate, which is precarious by its nature, depending on the elector’s willing, while a high public function and the civil servants’ positions can be sure of their permanency. Due to this reason, the Administration could stop being a simple function in the existing conditions but it could become a real public administrative power distinct from the executive one. -
Federalismul şi descentralizarea administrativă din perspectiva redimensionării principiului separaţiei puterilor L’organisation des collectivités locales a été regardée à partir de son interprétation fonctionnelle mais la question de la centralisation-décentralisation est généralement laissée à l’écart de la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs, même si elle apparaît en filigrane. L’idée de Montesquieu selon laquelle les trois puissances du pouvoir „par le mouvement nécessaire des choses, ... sont contraintes d’aller, elles seront forcées d’aller de concert”, fonde une unité qui permet d’appréhender les rapports entre les organes centraux et non-centraux. Pour réaliser cette unité, Montesquieu propose de diviser la production de la norme en distinguant la faculté de statuer remise à un organe de la faculté d’empêcher remise à un autre organe. -
Consideraţiuni cu privire la limitele libertăţii de conştiinţă în legislaţia naţională şi în practica CEDO Toute personne a droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion. Ce droit implique la liberté de changer de religion ou de conviction, ainsi que la liberté de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction individuellement ou collectivement, en public ou en privé, par le culte, l’enseignement, les pratiques et l’accomplissement des rites. La liberté de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction peut creer des tensions avec autre droits fondamentaux: la liberté d’expression peut porter atteinte au droit au respect de la vie privée, au droit à la liberté de religion, aux droits à l’égalité etc. Ces conflits et tensions sont dans une certaine mesure résolus par les exceptions aux droits, lorsque celles-ci sont nécessaires et proportionnées à la réalisation d’un objectif légitime, comme la protection des droits d’autrui. La nature non absolue de nombreux droits de l’homme s’accompagne implicitement de la notion d’un équilibre entre les droits concurrents, et le maintien d’un certain équilibre. Les tribunaux devront évaluer le caractère proportionné de toute restriction à la liberté de conscience et de religion à la lumière du principe du maintien de l’égalité et de la protection d’autres droits de l’homme comme le respect de la vie privée et la liberté d’expression, l’objectif étant de concilier la protection de la liberté de religion et la protection des droits d’autrui.